In this paper, we present a reliable and accurate low computational complexity classifier for a fence intrusion detection sensor. The sensor, a standalone perimeter security sensor, classifies six different types of intrusion attempts on chain-link fences. The designed classifier, a dynamic sequence analyzer followed by a static classifier, obtains more than 95 percent accuracy in intrusion classification. Furthermore, its computational simplicity allows for the classifier to be run on the sensor's 16 MIPS processor. The sequence analyzer, a HMM with time-dependent transition probability matrix; localizes the most probable time window of different intrusion classes. Then, the static classifier utilizes the analyzer output in intrusion classification. The implemented HMM, a specific set of non-homogenous HMM, has been defined and trained using the Baum-Welch technique. The nonhomogenous HMM accuracy in intrusion localization surpasses homogenous HMM; while the designed classifier achieves three percent improvement comparing to a HMM classifier.
INTRODUCTION
Increasing threat and attacks to secure areas such as airports, defense border lines, nuclear power stations demands a set of perimeter intrusion detection systems (PIDS) to monitor and investigate activities around these areas. The fence intrusion detection sensor [1] is a part of PIDS developed to analyze and identify intrusion attempts on perimeter chain-link fences. The sensor, a stand-alone sensing and computational module, detects and classifies intrusion attempts into five different categories. The intrusion attempts are categorized as lean, rattle, kick, climb and scratch [2] and the designed sensor field test proves 95 percent intrusion classification accuracy. The existing commercial sensors merely determine intrusions on the fences; generating an equal threat level for different intrusions attempts. In contrast, the designed fence sensor provides decisions about the threat level of individual intrusions by checking the classification result. The sensor design demands all processing to be done locally on the module. Perimeters may realistically be covered by thousands of these sensors; hence a distributed processing is the most efficient power and computational wise technique in intrusion analysis. In distribute processing, each sensor detects and determines intrusions locally; then it transmits the result to a central unit. As in any other stand-alone module, power limitations restrict the computational resources available in the sensor. The restriction requires a simple and efficient classifier to be implemented in the module; meanwhile achieving reliability and accuracy is an inevitable challenge in the design. For example, for highly secure areas any false rejection of climbing is intolerable. In this paper, we introduce a low-computational cost and reliable classifier by utilizing a non-homogenous HMM (NHMM) [3, 4] .
Intrusion signals recorded by sensors demonstrate temporal and dynamic patterns, implying the use of HMM as a standard dynamic classifier. A trivial technique for intrusion classification deals with defining and applying one HMM for each intrusion class. This method is practically inadequate, because the sensor's computational resource, a 16MIPS RICS processor, is not sufficient for implementing five HMM models plus their postprocessing task within the classifier's time resolution (200 ms, the signal update period). To go beyond this limitation, we utilized a NHMM model for intrusion localization along with a static classifier. The new classifier not only has lower computational complexity, but also presents a higher classification performance comparing to the trivial method. The chief reason for the complexity reduction plus performance improvement is the precise intrusion localization provided by NHMM. The sequence analyzer, a dynamic classifier, is designed as a 3-state HMM with a timedependent transition probability matrix. It indentifies the most probable time-window of the signal for different intrusions. Then the static classifier, a Bayesian classifier, examines the likelihood of different intrusions to find the most probable intrusion class. Data analysis shows that the performance of NHMM in intrusion localization surpasses that of homogenous HMM. Moreover, the NHMM generates higher likelihood values than HMM in signal sequences, with an equal state definition for both models. The dynamicity of transition probability matrix brings more flexibility in the model, allowing it to follow unusual and abrupt behaviors in the intrusion signal. In part 2, we briefly introduce different intrusion signals in the chain-link fence plus their properties. Part 3 of the paper introduces the implemented NHMM and its training scheme. Part 4 of the paper describes the structure of the classifier. Part 5 compares performance of homogenous and non-homogenous HMM on the test data. The last two parts of the paper discuss the pros and cons of the presented technique plus future research.
FENCE INTRUSION SIGNALS
The sensing module in the fence sensor is a 3-axis digital accelerometer (X, Y and Z axes) measuring the vibration signal in 12-bits covering a -6 to 6 g acceleration range. It samples the vibration signal with 640 samples per second per axis. The sensor is attached to the fence, while its Z axis is aligned to be perpendicular to the fence. The intrusion signal is categorized to five different classes including kick, lean, rattle, climb and scratches. Figure 1 shows a sample of each intrusion signal recorded on a slack fence. The source of kick and lean intrusions are short-time forces imposed on the fence. As a result, the event starts with a high-level acceleration plus high-frequency vibrations. With time, the acceleration level decays exponentially and vibration gets a harmonic structure. In climbing, rattling and scratch intrusions, the vibration source has longer time periods. The decay pattern and the transition from high-frequency to harmonic vibration are less prominent. The intrusion signal analysis demonstrates the rattling signal to be more or less periodic, while the climb and scratch signals are chaotic. The signal time-domain envelope plus its time-frequency features are used in intrusion classification. The time-domain envelope is represented by Z-axis energy plus relative energy in X and Y-axis to Z-axis. The time-frequency features are extracted by measuring Z and X axis signal energy in a set of filter-banks [1] . Features are extracted in 256-point (400 ms) windows of signal with 50 percent (200 ms) overlap. The logarithm of Z-axis energy in successive frames is passed to the transition probability matrix of the sequence analyzer. The energy plus time-frequency features determine the sequence observation of the analyzer. Non-intrusion (called S1 state), harmonic (called S2 state) and high-frequency (called S3 state) periods determine three states of the model. In the next part, we introduce the dynamic transition probability and its training procedure.
NHMM MODELING AND TRAINING PROCESS
Assume O={ , i=1,…,N} is the observation generated by a HMM model and its hidden states are C=c(i). The joint distribution of observation is,
The emission process p( i | , c i ) is considered equal for the sequence and the transition probability matrix p i (c i |c i-1 ) is a function of observation index, i. i is the feature set representing i th data frame, and determines the state parameter. The transition matrix dependency to sequence index means that the hidden states follow a NHMM chain. To estimate parameters of the local transition probability matrix, the matrix entries are defined as a function dependent to a set of observed features [4] . The transition probability matrix is modeled by a function of energy in adjacent frames. Based on the state definition, the transition probability matrix, A, is a 3-by-3 matrix with the following definition for its pq th entry. (2), the state and transition probability equations are factorized to additive components, making training procedure simple.
( ) [4] , extracting the most probable states for the observed data. Then model parameters are estimated from the decoded states. The training process repeats until the likelihood improvement of observation drops to a certain level or the decoded observation has no significant state changes. In the model definition, we assigned a specific state (S1, S2 and S3) to each part of the signal. Training signals are roughly labeled with their matching states; as a result the training initialization step starts with desired state definitions (a semi-supervised learning). After training, the intrusion signals can be decoded with the Viterbi algorithm to localize intrusions. Figure 2 displays the extracted transition in a test signal. The recorded signal contains 40 seconds of vibration in a slack fence. It contains a combination of intrusion attempts starting with two kicks and following by two leans, climbing, two scratch periods. In Figure 2 , intrusion events have been localized precisely (within 200 msec of the actual event). The localization result is passed to a state machine, a part of the sequence analyzer. The state machine determines different feature sets which are passed to the different intrusion classes of the classifier. In the next section, the classifier structure will be described. The sequence analyzer, the processing step before the classifier, has two main tasks. It determines the proper time-window for different intrusions; the feature sets of which are passed to each class of the classifier. Also, it decides when the classifier needs to be run. Figure 3 describes the logic of the analyzer. Based on the diagram, three different feature sets are passed to the static classifier. Assuming an intrusion has been detected and we are in the i th observed frame; the first feature set includes features of the last five frames starting from the (i-4) th frame. This feature set represents features for rattling, climbing and scratch intrusion classes. The second feature set, defining kick or lean features, is the five frames starting from the last (S1 S3) or (S2 S3) states transition. The last feature set, representing an alternative lean feature set, contains the five frames starting from the last (S1 S2) state transition. The feature set definition comes from the fact that every kick starts with a transition to S3 state, while in a lean intrusion a state change starting from S1 state happens. State transitions provide more information, which can be applied to the classifier. For example, the transition structure determines the likelihood of different intrusions' occurrence. In the other words, it is not always necessary to compare the likelihood of all classes, causing lower computational cost. Moreover, the analyzer counts the number of S1 and S2 states to determine end of classification task. Successive S1 or S2 states represent low level threat intrusion attempts; requiring no extra classification task. It is claimed that the design of sequence analyzer plus the static classifier models the dynamicity of different intrusions precisely. In the next part, we analyze the classifier performance. First, performance of non-homogenous and homogenous HMM in intrusion localization will be compared. In the second step, we compare the performance of three classifiers; a standard HMM classifier including five HMM models for different intrusions along with the static classifier preceded by homogenous and nonhomogenous HMM sequence analyzer. Table 1 shows the false accept rate (FAR) and false reject rate (FRR) in the test data recorded for 60 minutes in a slack fence (with two different intruders). The FAR represents incorrect intrusion detection and FRR means failure in intrusion localization. Classifier B attains three percent improvement over classifier C, while the difference between classifier B and A performance is higher. Figure 4 .c shows classifier results for 50 seconds of the data. The intrusion signal contains a rattle period following by three leans, a kick and a climb intrusion attempt. Failing to localize the two lean attempts, the classifier recognized them as background or rattle class. Performance analysis verifies that the classifier B traces the dynamicity of signal in a real data. The success of the classifier revisits the importance of correct intrusion localization.
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

CONCLUSION
Generally a dynamic classifier output is reprocessed to improve classifier performance. Structural, statistical or semantic information are utilized in post processing. In the fence classifier, the order of classifier and post-processing has been reversed to reduce computational cost. This ordering works because we apply more information of the intrusion signal in the model. We showed that the boundary between successive intrusions can be modeled with a non-homogenous HMM. The NHMM modeling with energy dependent transition matrix performed accurately, verifying its ability to follow the signal dynamicity. The technique can be applied for dynamic classifiers when there is knowledge about the dependency model in adjacent frames.
FUTURE WORKS
The training algorithm was developed using Baum-Welch method, while it can be done by EM algorithm. The EM algorithm is more reluctant to outlier training points. The proposed algorithm is a set of more general case of infinite states and Dirichlet process [6] . The relation between the applied method and infinite-states model needs to be investigated. Practically, we need to check stability and reliability of the model for unknown scenarios of intrusion signal.
A new definition of intrusion class, penetration, will be added in the classifier.
